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Accountability and liability of managers 
for protecting the public from wildlife should 
not assume an unrealistic ability to forecast 
attacks approaching the certainty of 20:20 
hindsight after an attack. Although analysis 
of past attacks can yield valuable insights, 
it is likely to create exaggerated perceptions 
of average risk, of how much risk can be 
reduced by management actions, and of how 
predictable individual animals are during 
any given encounter. Such exaggeration can 
be minimized by understanding each species’ 
aggression within the whole scope of its social 
behavior, body language, and interactions with 
humans. 
Wildlife managers are responsible for 
keeping the public safe from wildlife, as well 
as for conserving wildlife species that, at least, 
occasionally injure or kill someone.  Managers 
should balance the demands of public safety 
with those of public freedom to enjoy wildlands 
without killing animals unnecessarily. This is a 
balancing act that would work best if managers 
could make ballpark estimates of risk of 
attack under a wide range of scenarios, then 
tailor countermeasures to each scenario. Both 
estimating risks and countering them could 
be done in ways that assure accountability of 
managers who fail to act responsibly, yet, protect 
wise and diligent managers from unwarranted 
liability.
The difficulties of this challenge are 
emphasized by the recent judgment against the 
U.S. Forest Service (USFS) for nearly $2 million. 
The award was made to the family of Samuel 
Ives, the 11-year-old boy who was camping with 
his family in Utah’s Uintah National Forest, was 
killed by a black bear (Ursus americanus; Francis 
versus State of Utah 2010). At approximately 
0500 hours on that same day, and at the very 
same campsite, the bear had ripped into another 
tent and struck another man in the head without 
injuring him. The victim and his friends drove 
the bear away, then, reported the incident to the 
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (UDWR), 
which sent personnel with dogs to trail the bear 
and kill it. When the bear’s trail was eventually 
lost several kilometers away and hours later, 
the trackers gave up for the day. Although an 
off-duty USFS law enforcement officer was 
notified of the morning incident, the report was 
not passed on to other authorities who might 
have assured that warnings were posted and 
that campers were verbally informed of the 
incident. Because of this oversight, the court 
found the USFS negligent, resulting in the boy’s 
death (Kevan Francis and Rebecca Ives versus 
United States of America). A separate suit was 
initiated against UDWR (Francis versus State of 
Utah 2010). 
Without a fuller knowledge of those events 
and a deeper understanding of relevant law, I 
would not wish to question the court’s decision. 
Nevertheless, I cannot ignore the wave of 
apprehension that this case is sending through 
wildlife-wildland management agencies. How 
will the Ives case affect future management of 
potentially lethal wildlife? Will agencies devote 
more of their dwindling resources to research 
on human–wildlife conflicts to keep improving 
methods of protecting the public without 
shortchanging their other responsibilities? Or 
will sympathy for victims, sensitivity to bad 
press, and fear of exploitive litigation force 
agencies to focus on more direct means of 
defending themselves to forestall lawsuits or to 
win them in courts of law? 
One of the most counterproductive forms of 
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agency self-defense is excessively uniform and 
simplistic policy. Presumably, as long as there 
is official consensus within an agency or among 
agencies on which safety precautions to use, no 
one implementing them can be singled out for 
blame if and when they fail. Uniformity also 
facilitates educating agency personnel and the 
public about wildlife safety, because everyone 
is sending and receiving the same KISS (Keep-
It-Simple-Stupid) messages.
Nevertheless, any simplistic, 1-size-fits-all, 
set of precautions for a species is doomed to 
mediocrity. I offer the following 5 characteristics 
for a more sophisticated management policy.
1. It should be cost effective. Except in the case 
of emergency actions, any new precaution 
should be screened to assure that the 
gains in public safety outweigh any new 
constraints on public freedom in wildlands. 
For example, what would the costs and 
benefits to the public be of forbidding them 
to bicycle or walk dogs in a national forest or 
park frequented by bears? How would those 
policies affect wildlife?
2. A species, such as bear, should not be killed 
to increase public safety unless it poses a 
substantive risk and not merely pro forma 
because someone was frightened by the 
animal.  Risk assessment should be based 
both on analysis of previous attacks and 
on knowledge about bear behavior that has 
not led to attacks. For example, managers 
should learn to distinguish offensive versus 
defensive threats and to recognize how 
likely any given behavior (e.g., jaw popping 
or pant huffing) is to presage a bear trying 
to injure either a human or a another bear 
(Stringham 2011).
3. Pressures for uniformity should not be 
allowed to stifle adaptation of management 
practices to situational variations in the 
ways that animals interact with humans. 
For example, agencies might continue to 
allow closely viewing of brown bears (Ursus 
arctos) and black bears on the Pacific coasts 
of Alaska and British Columbia where these 
animals are especially tolerant of one another 
and of people, but keep viewers farther from 
bears in habitats where the bruins are much 
less forgiving (Smith et al. 2005, Herrero et 
al. 2005).  Viewers might be allowed greater 
flexibility when natural foods are abundant 
than when they are scarce and bears are 
less tolerant. Viewing might be encouraged 
only at sites where bears and people on 
foot can usually see one another from a 
distance of at least 100 m, but discouraged 
where bears and people frequently surprise 
one another at much closer distances. 
Habituation might be encouraged in 
situations where the benefits of reducing 
bear defensiveness—the leading cause 
of brown bear inflicting serious or fatal 
injuries (Herrero 1985)—outweigh any 
increase in offensive aggression (Stringham 
2009, 2010). Professionals might be allowed 
to provide food to bears to lure them away 
from residential areas (Rogers 2011); but, 
all feeding of bears might continue to be 
forbidden where the reverse is true.
4. Policy should guide managers in making 
cost:benefit analyses. If numerous people 
are at risk from a bear, how much would 
their risk have to be reduced to compensate 
for any consequent increase in risk for a 
much smaller number of other people? 
For example, caribou (Rangifer tarandus) 
herds cross rivers each year, and numerous 
calves drown. Suppose the carcasses 
float downstream until they hang up on 
sandbars in an area frequented by anglers 
and brown bears are attracted to the 
carcasses. Recognizing high danger that 
some angler may be attacked by a carcass-
defending bear, a proactive manager might 
decide that the carcasses must be moved 
and that the only feasible way is to float 
them downstream to areas seldom visited 
by people. Unfortunately, in the event that 
someone is mauled by a bear defending a 
relocated carcass, the likelihood that the 
relocation saved other people from injury 
might be offset by its elevating the risk to 
100 percent for another individual. A similar 
problem might arise when managers haze 
a bear away from numerous anglers or 
from a residential area. The bear then may 
go toward another person, injuring him, a 
scenario the manager had not forseen.  
5. Policy should assure that managers meet at 
least minimum standards of due diligence 
in each scenario that they are likely to face. 
Unlike attorneys who study past tragedies 
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food conditioned, ill, injured, or malnourished; 
or, they are unskilled at foraging, capturing 
prey or coexisting with humans; or they have 
a history of prior aggression. So, too, a popular 
account might state that most victims have at 
least one of the following characteristics: they 
surprised the animal at close range; or, hey 
were associated with foods or other things that 
attracted the animal. Additionally, they might 
have been perceived by the animal as vulnerable; 
as resembling prey; as competing with the 
animal for space, territory, food or mates; or as 
threatening the animal or its offspring.
Professional reports, on the other hand, are 
more likely to quantify associations, sighting 
the percentage of cases where the animal or 
the victim had one or more of those traits. This 
is illustrated by the findings of Herrero et al. 
(2011) that were based on all 63 instances of 
someone being killed by a black bear in North 
America since 1900: 
• Of 56 fatal attacks by black bears, 88% 
were predatory;
• Of 36 fatal attacks, 92% were inflicted by 
an adult or subadult male; and
• 91% pf victims killed by black bears were 
alone or with just 1 other person.
Based an such statistics, if someone were to 
be killed by a black bear, one might confidently 
predict that the culprit was a predatory adult or 
subadult male and that the victim was alone or 
with a single companion. 
However, such a conclusion would be made 
of course, after someone had been killed. It 
is not clear how such statistics can best help 
managers predict the likelihood of attack before 
one occurs. For example, what do Herrero’s 
statistics tell us about risk of predatory attack 
in California or in any other state or province 
where no one has been killed by a black bear 
in the last 110+ years—the same situation that 
existed in Utah until the Ives boy was killed? In 
fatality-free areas, are adult and subadult males 
really 11-fold more dangerous than females? 
And if so, how dangerous are females, e.g., 1 
nonfatal attack per 103, 105, or 107 encounters 
with a human? 
Extrapolations from known killers to entire 
populations or metapopulations of a species 
are best treated as hypotheses in need of 
verification. The need for caution is perhaps 
best illustrated by recalling that most people 
to fix blame and liability, biologists study 
them to prevent future tragedies. Also, 
unlike attorneys, we biologists do not make 
our living by playing Monday-morning-
quarterback, focusing on a rare tragedy 
and dissecting it with the certainty of 20:20 
hindsight. Hindsight concerning an attack 
might imply that once events A, B, and C 
occurred, tragedy was virtually inevitable. 
Indeed, if a bear has even once tried to prey 
on a human, most managers would expect 
more of the same and try to remove the bear. 
Some agencies might also do so even if a 
bear breaks into an occupied tent, as in the 
Ives case. However, if a bear’s offense was 
merely foraging in campsites or defensively 
threatening someone who had stoned it, 
would this offense really increase risk of 
predatory attack by this bear? By how 
much?
Merely knowing that factors A, B, and C 
might increase the likelihood of tragedy does 
not tell us how high that likelihood is (e.g., 
one in 102, 105, or 108 encounters). Nor does 
that knowledge alone enable us to predict the 
specific encounter during which A, B, and C 
will have tragic consequences, rather than 
the innocuous consequences they have had 
during countless other encounters. Precision 
and accuracy of prediction are limited by what 
is known about all the factors contributing to 
an encounter’s outcome. The more managers 
know, the better they can forecast optimal 
actions for meeting their numerous competing 
priorities with limited resources.
Identifying reliable risk predictors has 
been the goal of numerous studies on large 
carnivores, especially (a) bears (Herrero 1970, 
1985; Herrero and Higgins 1999, 2003; Herrero 
et al. 2011; Miller and Tutterow 1998; Smith et 
al. 2005), (b) cougars (Deurbrouck and Miller 
2001, Etling 2001, Mattson et al. 2011), and (c) 
wolves (McNay 2002, Graves 2007, Geist 2007). 
There also have been studies on ungulates 
(Geist 1978, 2011; Walther 1984).
Popular accounts of bear attacks commonly 
are stated as simple, qualitative associations. 
Such an account, for example, might state that 
the majority of large North American mammals 
that kill or seriously injure people have at least 
one of the following traits: they are habituated, 
8 Human–Wildlife Interactions 7(1)
who kill other people are also adolescent or 
adult males. Yet, most human males never try 
to kill anyone. Case-by-case quantification of 
attack-risk by either bears or people requires 
information on a lot more variables than just 
age, sex, and species. For example, how much 
could risk of attack by an adult male black 
bear be altered (e.g., 0.1%, 50%, or 99.9%) by 
factors, such as shortage of wild foods, access 
to anthropogenic foods, conditioning of bears 
to those foods, habituation of bears to people, 
density of the bear population, or sport hunting 
of bears or ungulates? How much might a 
government agency reduce risk for visitors to 
a park by providing them with a bear-safety 
brochure, warning signs, or verbal instructions? 
How much can visitors reduce their own risk 
by following those precautions, e.g., wearing 
bear-bells while hiking or by surrounding tents 
with an electric fence?
Statistics for attacks by bears would be most 
useful if they were directly comparable to 
statistics for more familiar animals, such as 
dogs, horses, and bees. The common practice of 
simply contrasting the numbers of people injured 
or killed by each species is highly misleading 
because it does not address differences in 
exposure (see Pritchard 2000). Exposure is partly 
a function of abundance of each species. When 
abundance is considered, the >5-fold higher 
annual lethal attack rate for all dogs over all 
bears (16 people killed by dogs versus 3 people 
killed by bears per year; Herrero 1985, Sacks 
et al. 2000) becomes a 19-fold higher rate per 
bear than per dog (1/220,000 bears versus 1/4.2 
million dogs; Stringham, unpublished report). 
Even more insightful figures could be obtained 
if we could limit calculations to the numbers of 
bears and dogs that encounter a human and to 
the numbers of people who encounter a bear or 
a dog. Then, risks could be compared in terms 
of attacks per person per animal per encounter. 
Indeed, probability of being mauled during an 
encounter should be separated from probability 
of having an encounter, as Mattson et al. (2011) 
did for pumas (Puma concolor). This distinction 
is essential for evaluating risk factors (e.g., 
habituation), given that those which raise or 
lower probability of encounters may have a 
different effect on probability of attack during 
an encounter.
Continent-wide summary statistics on 
risk levels and on factors that control risk 
level should eventually be integrated into a 
cumulative risk model that is designed so that 
managers could input knowledge about their 
local bear population. Then, such statistics 
should allow the model to compute both 
local baseline risk and how much risk could 
be modified above or below baseline by each 
environmental change (e.g., climatic warming) 
or management option.
Without such information, how can managers 
assess the cost-effectiveness of each option so 
that their resources can be focused where they do 
most good to enhance public safety and to meet 
their other responsibilities, while minimizing 
unwarranted liability? How are managers, 
administrators, judges, juries or the general 
public to avoid either vastly overestimating or 
underestimating the benefits of each precaution 
that managers could implement? How are 
judges and juries to avoid overestimating the 
capacity of managers to prevent attacks without 
unacceptably constraining public enjoyment of 
wildlife and without preventively killing far too 
many benign animals? How are they to assess 
liability based on realistic understanding of the 
limitations of managers to predict and control 
what wildlife will do? 
Producing and implementing management 
plans with the 5 characteristics listed above 
would be markedly facilitated by better support 
for innovative research on wildlife behavior. 
If ursid predatory behavior had been better 
understood, then the quick return of the bear to 
the Ives campsite might have been predicted and 
adequate countermeasures taken. Knowledge 
can save both lives and money.
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